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In Justice is all Virtue found in sum.1 
“The line between legal and moral guidelines is a very blurry one in 
my mind,” commented one subject.  “I don’t think a judge can 
clearly exercise one without the other having some bearing.”2 
INTRODUCTION 
or years, the legal academy has been obsessed with two dominant 
normative theories: law and economics and individual rights.  
From environmental law to criminal procedure, every debate seems to 
start and end there.  This narrow perspective is particularly evident in 
private law fields, such as contract.  In some sense, this obsession is 
not surprising—scholars across the social sciences and humanities 
struggle to break free of the same old debates between 
consequentialism (the philosophy on which law and economics is 
based) and deontology (the philosophy on which rights theories are 
based).3 
 
1 ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 259 (E. Capps et al. eds., H. Rackham trans., 
1926). 
2 Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Jonathan Baron, Moral Judgment and Moral Heuristics in 
Breach of Contract, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 405, 423 (2009). 
3 Many scholars who make this observation credit it to Elizabeth Anscombe’s famous 
1958 essay, Modern Moral Philosophy.  See, e.g., G.E.M. Anscombe, Modern Moral 
Philosophy, in ETHICS 186 (Judith J. Thomson & Gerald Dworkin eds., 1968); Colin 
Farrelly & Lawrence B. Solum, An Introduction to Aretaic Theories of Law, in VIRTUE 
JURISPRUDENCE 1, 3 (Colin Farrelly & Lawrence B. Solum eds., 2008).  Since that essay, 
scholars across disciplines, who do not identify primarily with either tradition, have noted 
the theoretical “logjam” and have been offering their own ideas about how legal theory 
can transcend it.  Id. at 3–4 (noting that Anscombe’s work highlighted the seemingly 
irresolvable competition between the two leading normative philosophical theories, 
deontology and consequentialism); see also Roger Crisp, Modern Moral Philosophy and 
the Virtues, in HOW SHOULD ONE LIVE?: ESSAYS ON THE VIRTUES 1, 1–2 (Roger Crisp 
ed., 1996) (noting that Anscombe’s essay charged moral philosophers to put aside rights 
and consequentialism until one could better explain the tenets of the two principles—
“pleasure” and “intention”—and suggesting that virtue may be the key to such an 
explanation). 
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But in the last few years, an old normative theory has begun to 
resurface: Aristotelian virtue.  Though some may think that “virtue” 
went out with the ancient Greeks, virtue is both, in fact, alive and well 
and receiving increased attention from scholars of philosophy, 
history, and political science.  Amongst law faculties, however, 
conversations about virtue theory have just begun. 
Perhaps because it is so unfamiliar to legal theorists, the idea that 
“virtue” has any power to influence contemporary law, let alone 
contract doctrine, is bound to provoke strong intuitive reactions.  On 
one hand, the notion of a viable, alternative normative basis to legal 
theory strikes a compelling chord.4  To that end, some legal scholars 
are so taken with the idea of virtue that they have claimed recently 
that “the fundamental concepts of legal philosophy should not be 
welfare, efficiency, autonomy, or equality; the fundamental notions of 
legal theory should be virtue and excellence.”5  Yet others are 
significantly more skeptical, especially as to private law.  Indeed, 
outside of a few legal theorists who write about the philosophy of 
corrective justice,6 many private law scholars do not consider virtue 
theory at all. 
This Article argues that legal scholars, and especially private law 
scholars, should be paying more attention to virtue theory.  Unlike the 
two dominant normative theories, the analytical approach of virtue 
theory requires a symbiotic focus on both the means and ends of law.  
As will be explained below, neither of the two dominant theories 
account fully for both means and ends; instead, each privileges one 
over the other.  By contrast, because of an inherent interrelationship 
between means and ends in virtue theory, this theory may offer a 
much more complete understanding of law, including private law, 
than the theories of either law and economics or individual rights.7 
 
4 In contract, “pluralism” is one of these theories that attempts to transcend.  See 
generally Nathan Oman, Unity and Pluralism in Contract Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1483 
(2005).  “Contractualism” is another.  See Robin Bradley Kar, Contractualism About 
Contract Law 101 (Loyola, Law Sch. L.A., Legal Studies Paper No. 2007-29, 2008), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=993809. 
5 Farrelly & Solum, supra note 3, at 2–3. 
6 See infra notes 65–73 and accompanying text.  “Corrective justice” is the Aristotelian 
conception of justice that applies to interactions between private citizens, such as contract 
transactions.  Its correlate is “distributive justice,” which is the conception of justice that 
applies to interactions between the state and its citizens. 
7 By “private law,” this Article refers to those fields in which law regulates transactions 
between private citizens, such as tort, property, and contract.  By “public law,” this Article 
refers to those fields in which law regulates the interaction between the government and its 
citizens.  This Article focuses on one area of private law in particular: contract. 
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Specifically, contract law has challenges that virtue theory’s 
means-ends approach is uniquely able to address.  Those challenges 
arise from two basic facts about the institution of contract.  First, a 
contract is both an economic and a social thing at once.  Contract’s 
economic dimension is obvious, but, as some scholars have recently 
reminded us, contract also has a social dimension: the process of 
exchange creates a relationship between the contracting parties.  
Second, although not always thought of in this way, contract law is 
based on intent: a foundational question in contract adjudication is 
“what did the parties intend?”8  Current theoretical frameworks are 
unable to fully account for contract’s duality as both an economic and 
social institution, and, as a result, current approaches fail to fully 
capture parties’ intent.  Part I of the Article explains these limits of 
current theoretical approaches. 
There are challenges to any conversation about virtue as a 
normative legal theory.  A threshold challenge is that “virtue” is one 
of those broad-brush terms, which, on one hand, seem very familiar 
but, on the other hand, are hard to situate with precision.  This lack of 
precision makes the discussion seem unusually daunting: “virtue” 
seems intuitively too lofty, too ancient,9 and too undefined for 
contemporary law.  Yet, these challenges can be overcome by a more 
precise definition of “virtue” as a practical matter, which Part II 
provides. 
After defining terms, Part III of the Article turns to the existing 
dialogues around virtue theory.  These conversations may be relevant 
to law in many ways.  For example, historians of political science and 
law are revisiting virtue.  The historians’ work is particularly useful to 
this project because the work exposes the hidden role of virtue in 
philosophical efforts, which are typically seen at odds with this 
approach.  For example, although the precise nature of the 
relationship between Adam Smith’s separate works on morality and 
economics is disputed, there are good reasons to believe the father of 
 
8 See generally Lawrence M. Solan, Contract as Agreement, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
353 (2007) (arguing that the standard account of contract theory as predominately 
“objective” does not accurately account for what courts do, which is to work hard to find 
the parties’ actual, subjective agreement). 
9 See Martha C. Nussbaum, The Supreme Court, 2006 Term—Foreword: Constitutions 
and Capabilities: “Perception” Against Lofty Formalism, 121 HARV. L. REV. 4, 33 (2007) 
(“To talk about Greek and Roman thought in the context of modern American law might 
seem oddly remote, and yet the historical sources of the modern ideas I discuss continue to 
be highly salient.”).  Of the continued relevance of such sources, see infra text 
accompanying note 107. 
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the “invisible hand” theory of the free market actually wrote The 
Wealth of Nations against a unifying backdrop of virtue theory.10  But 
historians are not the only scholars talking about virtue.  Philosophers, 
political scientists, and even some constitutional law scholars are all 
taking virtue seriously.  Some in the legal academy have recently 
coined the phrase “virtue jurisprudence” and are now applying virtue 
to concrete problems in law. 
Part IV takes up the challenge of applying virtue to contract law.  
Although the applied law and virtue work has been done primarily in 
public law fields so far, it need not be so limited.  In this Part, the 
Article returns to and explains the claim that contract law has two 
unique challenges virtue is well suited to address, namely that 
contract is a dual institution, both economic and social, and that 
contract is based on intent.  The Article then probes further into how 
virtue theory might apply in contract, exploring how virtue theory can 
contribute to two routine areas of contract interpretation: 
“reasonableness” terms and the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing.  Part IV ends with a call for further research into other, more 
hotly debated topics in contract law.  Finally, in Part V, the Article 
considers and answers several common objections to virtue as a basis 
for legal theory.  None hold water. 
In sum, the goal of this Article is to explore how virtue theory, as a 
normative basis for law, can be as good or better than either of the 
two currently dominant theories, consequentialism and deontology.  It 
does not make the claim that any particular disposition is virtuous, or 
that the law should require that a party to a contract hold a particular 
disposition.  Rather, it proposes that scholars begin to open their eyes 
to a new perspective in private law. 
I 
THE BLIND SPOTS IN EXISTING CONTRACT THEORIES 
Everyone agrees that the current, dominant normative theories of 
contract are law and economics, which this Article takes as a form of 
consequentialist theory, and various strands of rights-based 
approaches, which this Article takes as forms of deontological (i.e., 
 
10 Peter Stein, Adam Smith’s Jurisprudence—Between Morality and Economics, 64 
CORNELL L. REV. 621, 622 (1979) (“More recently scholars have recognized that Smith’s 
various studies were parts of a single whole, the study of man in society.  Smith organized 
this study around the moral virtues of prudence, justice, and benevolence. . . . At Smith’s 
death, the study remained incomplete, for he never published, as he intended to do, a third 
book exploring the virtue of justice.” (footnote omitted)). 
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moral) theory.11  Consequentialism and deontology differ in a 
fundamental way: each theory approaches the question of, “Does a 
legal rule work?” or “Is a law good?” through a different lens.  Each 
different lens leads to a different focal point. 
As will be shown, consequentialist theories such as law and 
economics focus on the end of a rule: Does the rule result in a better 
position for each party to the contract?  By contrast, deontological 
theories such as consent or autonomy, focus on the means of the rule: 
Does the rule obligate the parties to do what is morally required (or 
justifiable)?  Thus, each theory proceeds from its own focal point.  
What falls out of either theory’s focus is left in a blind spot: this 
excess is either minimized or effectively assumed away. 
The result is that many debates over important topics in contract 
law—e.g., the debates over whether breach should be encouraged if it 
is efficient, what measure of damages best accounts for the injured 
party’s expectation interest, and how (or even whether) the 
“willfulness,” i.e., bad intent, of the breaching party’s conduct should 
matter—happen in the shadows of these blind spots.  When theorists 
from the two dominant approaches argue over an idea but fail to 
accredit and seriously engage with the other’s key premises, the effect 
is that of two “ships [passing] in the night.”12  Often, contract 
theorists do not seem to realize they are arguing in the other’s blind 
spot; they just keep pressing their points.  The result is something of a 
 
11 While this Article characterizes “law and economics” as a consequentialist approach 
to law, the author is familiar with the philosophical account of economics as “a science of 
means.”  Anthony Kronman, The Value of Moral Philosophy, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1751, 
1751 (1998) (“[Economics] describes the strategies people adopt to attain their goals at 
minimum cost . . . . It tells us how to achieve our ends in the least wasteful–the most 
economic–fashion . . . .”).  Such accounts are not disputed here; indeed, the author agrees 
that the social science of economics can tell analysts what choice will most efficiently 
achieve a party’s underlying transactional goals in any particular contract.  But if one 
understands a contracting party’s overarching legal goal as the most efficient attainment of 
underlying contractual goals—whatever these may be—then economic analysis of law 
starts to sound consequentialist.  In other words, no matter what a party’s contractual goal 
is (e.g., sell a house, produce widgets, hire an employee), if that party wants to achieve a 
goal as efficiently as possible, then efficiency becomes the ultimate, or overarching, goal.  
Thus, any selection of “means” to achieve the “end” of efficiency is just that: a means to 
an end.  In this conception, the end of efficiency is the highest priority.  That is not to deny 
that the particular question of how one can best achieve this end in any given transaction is 
a question of means. 
12 Jody S. Kraus, Philosophy of Contract Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 687, 687 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 
2002). 
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theoretical logjam.  The next section of this Article shines a light on 
the logjam and starts to suggest how virtue theory may break through. 
A.  Seeing the Logjam: The Efficient Breach Debate Between 
Economics and Rights Theorists 
Though law and economics has been very influential in contract 
law and theory over the past thirty years, the last ten years has seen 
strong growth in rights-based (deontological) approaches.13  Charles 
Fried’s “contract-as-promise” approach is one of the leading rights-
based theories;14 Randy Barnett’s “contract-as-consent” theory is 
another.15  Promise theory holds that contracts should be honored 
because promises should be kept, and promises should be kept 
because not doing so impinges on the injured party’s autonomy.16  
Consent theory holds that contracts transfer entitlements obtained by 
individual consent and not honoring consent violates the injured 
party’s autonomy.17  Protecting a party’s autonomy is a deontological 
or moral concern: it is wrong to break a promise because in so doing 
the promise-breaker “uses” another person.18  To guard against this 
problem, courts should not be guided by economic norms; contracting 
parties should not use each other to accomplish their goals, regardless 
of efficiency. 
To see how the theories argue in each other’s blind spots, one can 
consider the debate over efficient breach.  In this debate, the 
economists argue that breach is good and should be encouraged, if the 
breach leaves both parties to a contract better off than if the contract 
were to be performed.  Seen through the law and economics theory 
lens, all contracts come with an option to perform or pay damages 
upon nonperformance.  As long as the breaching party pays the price 
for nonperformance, then there is nothing wrong with breaching: 
everyone is better off as a result.19  The focus here is on the end 
 
13 Id. 
14 See generally CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF 
CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION (1981). 
15 Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1986). 
16 See FRIED, supra note 14, at 16. 
17 Barnett, supra note 15, at 294. 
18 FRIED, supra note 14, at 16 (noting that breaking a promise “is like (but only like) 
lying: the abuse of a shared social institution that is intended to invoke the bonds of trust.  
A liar and a promise-breaker each use another person.” (emphasis omitted)). 
19 See Richard A. Posner, Let Us Never Blame a Contract Breaker, 107 MICH. L. REV. 
1349, 1353–54 (2009).  Of course neither “economics” nor its “law and economics” 
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result; how the parties get there is of secondary concern and out of the 
focal point of the law-and-economist’s lens. 
By contrast, in the efficient breach debate, deontological theorists 
stress both that contracts are promises to perform and that the 
institution of promise requires that the parties treat each other in a 
certain way.  At the very least, this requirement includes not treating 
performance as optional.20  The focus here is on the notion that 
promises are to be kept; what result befalls the parties (wealth 
maximization or not) is not the concern.  End results are left largely to 
the side, in a blind spot. 
Using the efficient breach debate as a frame, consider more broadly 
how each theory works.  When reasoning through any question about 
the legitimacy of a law or a rule—such as whether the law encourages 
breach when breach is efficient—deontological theories focus on the 
means analysis.  So, when confronted with the question, “Is X a good 
rule?” deontological theories will ask if following the rule is morally 
required or justified.  If so, X is a good rule.  A deontologist would 
then prescribe: “Follow rule X because it is morally required.”  For 
the deontologist, following rule X inherently produces the right result.  
In this way, deontology focuses on the means—doing X—and the 
appropriate ends, the result, comes about derivatively. 
By contrast, consequentialist theories focus on the ends of law.  
When asking, “Is X a good rule?” consequentialist theories will ask if 
following rule X produces a good result.  If so, X is a good rule.  
 
offshoot is to be conflated with any single moral philosophy.  But, there is a link between 
the normative claims underlying the assertion that economics is productive as a tool for 
analyzing law and consequentialist-based moral philosophies.  However, Judge Richard 
Posner does not find the language of moral philosophy necessary or helpful to law or the 
economic analysis of law.  See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Law and Economics Is Moral, 24 
VAL. U. L. REV. 163, 166 (1990) (“I do not derive my economic libertarian views from a 
foundational moral philosophy such as the philosophy of Kant, or Locke’s philosophy of 
natural rights, or utilitarianism, or anything of that sort.  I regard moral philosophy as a 
weak field, a field in disarray, a field in which consensus is impossible to achieve in our 
society.  I do not think it provides a promising foundation for a philosophy of 
government.”).  Not everyone agrees that law and economics can be quite so simply 
divorced from morality.  See Robin Paul Malloy, The Limits of Science in Legal 
Discourse—A Reply to Posner, 24 VAL. U. L. REV. 175, 179 (“My last point of discussion 
in this brief reply to Judge Posner, is to point out that there was in his presentation, and I 
think there is in general, a mistaken portrayal of wealth maximization as not requiring 
moral decisions.  Despite the lack of an express moral dialogue in wealth maximization 
discourse, the movement to a model or a metaphor of economics as a science incorporates 
within it many assumptions and many moral choices.”). 
20 See Seana Shiffrin, Could Breach of Contract Be Immoral?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1551, 
1552 (2009). 
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Accordingly, a consequentialist would prescribe: “Follow rule X 
because following the rule will produce better results than not 
following it.”  For the consequentialist, following rule X is inherently 
the right thing to do.  In this way, consequentialism focuses on the 
ends—producing better results—and the means, actually following X, 
come about derivatively. 
On many levels, an economic approach to contract law makes a 
great deal of descriptive, normative, and intuitive sense: economics, 
as an analytical tool, responds very well to contract’s economic 
dimensions, and, despite whatever other dimensions contract has, it 
certainly has strong economic dimensions.  But, of course, contract 
also has noneconomic sides.  The noneconomic sides arise out of the 
fact that contract creates a relationship between the parties.21  
Contracts scholars have previously studied the relationship between 
parties22 and are starting to do so again with a different emphasis.23  
These scholars note that in any contract, the parties must engage with 
each other in order to make the exchange happen, and so, contract law 
and theory should account for their engagement.  And the scholars are 
right—parties do engage with each other and law should not be blind 
to that fact.  Of course, the economists are right as well—at least one 
reason parties contract is to maximize wealth.  In other words, both 
theories are right about that which they address. 
B.  Getting Beyond the Blind Spots 
As noted above, the two dominant theoretical schools tend to talk 
and write past each other when it comes to contracts.  But this is not 
just a theoretical problem—it also affects how courts analyze cases.  
This section explores this claim and suggests that virtue theory may 
help propel contract theory beyond the blind spots. 
In practice, courts applying one or the other of the dominant 
normative approaches will make assumptions about the parties’ intent 
to agree based on the premises of the particular approach.  The result 
is a sort of binary split in the case law on key questions in contract.  
For example, courts using a law and economics approach will assume 
that the parties had one single goal for the contract—maximizing each 
 
21 Daniel Markovits, Contract and Collaboration, 113 YALE L.J. 1417, 1419–20 
(2004). 
22 For a very good account of the relational theory of contract, see Jay M. Feinman, The 
Significance of Contract Theory, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283, 1299–1304 (1990). 
23 See generally Markovits, supra note 21. 
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party’s own financial welfare.  Pursuant to this assumption, the norm 
of efficiency governs.  Under the norm of efficiency, breach is 
desirable if it better maximizes wealth than performance would.  
Some courts have adopted this theory and apply it regularly.24  Others 
either explicitly reject efficient breach theory or limit it in some 
way.25  Similarly, some courts analyze cases as if the willfulness of 
the breaching party’s conduct matters either to the breach analysis26 
or to damages.27  Other courts find willfulness irrelevant; what 
matters is efficiency.28 
The missing piece in this system is that contract’s two 
dimensions—economic and social—need not be approached as 
though they are mutually exclusive.  There is no inherent rule of 
contract law or legal theory that requires analysts or courts to focus on 
either contract’s economic side or contract’s social/relationship side.  
The problem seems instead to be a failure of imagination: neither of 
the two dominant theories permits a dual-focused analysis. 
An important foundational claim in this Article is that virtue theory 
reasons about means and ends in a fully symbiotic way.  As a result, 
virtue theory may better account for contract’s dual dimensions and 
the simultaneous desire, by many contracting parties, to seek wealth 
in a just fashion.  As will be explained below, in virtue theory means 
and ends function as a single, interconnected, interrelated whole.  In 
sum, virtue theory’s symbiotic analysis of both means and ends has 
potentially potent explanatory power for law.  Indeed, virtue theory 
has influenced theorists and historians in multiple disciplines across 
the academy, including law. 
Before appreciating any of that, one must go back to first-order 
definitional questions.  What does the term virtue mean? 
 
24 See Patton v. Mid-Continent Sys., Inc., 841 F.2d 742, 750–51 (7th Cir. 1988). 
25 See Joseph M. Perillo, Misreading Oliver Wendell Holmes on Efficient Breach and 
Tortious Interference, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085, 1105–06 (2000); id. at 1097–98 nn.76–
79 (citing applicable cases). 
26 See, e.g., Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 890 (N.Y. 1921). 
27 See, e.g., Am. Standard, Inc. v. Schectman, 439 N.Y.S.2d 529, 532 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1981) (citing Groves v. John Wunder Co., 286 N.W. 235 (Minn. 1939)). 
28 See, e.g., Patton, 841 F.2d at 750 (“Even if the breach is deliberate, it is not 
necessarily blameworthy.  The promisor may simply have discovered that his performance 
is worth more to someone else.  If so, efficiency is promoted by allowing him to break his 
promise, provided he makes good the promisee’s actual losses.”). 
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II 
WHAT IS VIRTUE? 
Aristotle wrote, “[A] wise man also is praised for his disposition,    
. . . and praiseworthy dispositions we term virtues.”29  This Part 
explores more fully what virtue means.  Section A explains virtue 
theory’s dual focus on means and ends, and section B explains how 
virtue provides concrete guidance, as a way of choosing right action.  
Section C focuses on two types of virtue that are highly relevant to 
any discussion of law and virtue: the intellectual virtues and the virtue 
of justice.  Section D refutes a common objection raised when one 
puts “virtue” together with “law”: this section explains why virtue 
jurisprudence is not just “natural law all over again.” 
A.  Virtue Theory: Dual Focus on Means and Ends 
Virtue theory is a normative account of how individuals should live 
their lives.  It argues that humans can only reach their greatest 
happiness and fulfillment by making virtuous choices in life.  At its 
broadest level, Aristotelian virtue causes human beings to be happy 
and function well.30  Eudaimonia, or ultimate happiness, is achieved 
when people, through practice, make choices that constitute right 
action.31  Happiness is the “supreme good,” and a “happy man [is] 
one who ‘lives well’ or ‘does well.’”32 
Aristotle classified virtue into two types: moral (character traits)33 
and intellectual (reasoning traits).34  A virtue is the moral and 
 
29 ARISTOTLE, supra note 1, at 69 (footnote omitted). 
30 ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1105b17 to 18, reprinted in ARISTOTLE: 
SELECTIONS 347, 371–72 (Terence Irwin & Gail Fine trans., 1995) (“It should be said, 
then, that every virtue causes its possessors to be in a good state and to perform their 
functions well . . . .”); see also PETER BERKOWITZ, VIRTUE AND THE MAKING OF 
MODERN LIBERALISM 8 (1999) (“In general, then, Aristotle understood virtue as a 
condition or state of a thing that enabled it to perform a designated task well.”). 
31 Eudaimonia has been defined in various ways.  This definition is representative: “[A] 
human life that is intrinsically good from the individual’s viewpoint and the general 
perspective as well.”  Peter Koller, Law, Morality, and Virtue, in WORKING VIRTUE: 
VIRTUE ETHICS AND CONTEMPORARY MORAL PROBLEMS 191, 192 (Rebecca L. Walker 
& Philip J. Ivanhoe eds., 2007). 
32 ARISTOTLE, supra note 1, at 31 (“Happiness, therefore, being found to be something 
final and self-sufficient, is the End at which all actions aim.”); id. at 37–39 (“[O]ur 
definition accords with the description of the happy man as one who ‘lives well’ or ‘does 
well’ . . . .”). 
33 The moral virtues include: courage, temperance, liberality (meaning the observance 
of the mean in relation to giving and getting wealth), magnificence (meaning the 
observance of the mean as regards spending wealth), “great-souled man,” proper ambition, 
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intellectual disposition, as opposed to a feeling or a capacity, that 
leads a person to choose right action.35  In practical terms, virtues 
motivate an individual’s choices about behavior in particular 
situations.36 
Virtue refers at once to those features of personhood that allow for 
deliberation about right ends and about right means, symbiotically.  In 
virtue theory, means and ends are interrelated both because acting in a 
way consistent with moral virtue or character requires “right reason,” 
and because the “perfection of reason depends upon the cultivation of 
the virtues of character.”37  In a sentence beautifully capturing this 
important symbiosis, Aristotle wrote that a prudent person is one who 
is “able to deliberate well about what is good and advantageous for 
himself . . . as a means to the good life in general.”38  As such, in 
Aristotelian theory, the moral virtues are not and cannot be 
disaggregated from the intellectual virtues.  Both are bound up 
together in one complete circle of means and ends.  As Aristotle 
wrote, “Virtue ensures the rightness of the end we aim at, Prudence 
ensures the rightness of the means we adopt to gain that end.”39 
B.  Virtue’s Focus on Intent: Modes of Practical Choice 
Virtues are not simply character traits.  Virtues allow a person to 
choose the best action in any given situation.  It is immediately 
tempting to overwrite the concept of virtue with the concept of 
morality or duty, but the concepts are not the same.  Rather, choice is 
a critical idea here: “[N]o action is counted as virtuous in any way, 
unless it is mediated by a person’s own thought and selection.”40 
It is entirely possible for two separate people to make the same 
decision, while only one exhibits virtue.  A person who makes a good 
decision out of a mere duty has not exhibited virtue.  Duty means 
making a choice to follow a rule because following the rule is the 
right thing to do: following the rule is the right means, and by 
 
gentleness (observance of the mean in relation to anger), agreeableness, “sincerity toward 
one’s own merits,” wittiness, and justice.  Id. at 153–323. 
34 There are five intellectual virtues: “Art or technical skill, . . . Scientific Knowledge, 
Prudence, Wisdom, and Intelligence.”  Id. at 331–33 (footnote omitted). 
35 ARISTOTLE, supra note 30, at 371. 
36 See Koller, supra note 31, at 191. 
37 See BERKOWITZ, supra note 30, at 10. 
38 ARISTOTLE, supra note 1, at 337. 
39 Id. at 367. 
40 Nussbaum, supra note 9, at 33. 
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following the right rule, a right result is thereby produced.  Having 
virtue means that the choice of the right action occurs because a 
person has internalized the value that led to choosing that action in 
that situation.41 
A cynic might contend that the distinction between duty and virtue 
is irrelevant.  The difference appears entirely private and inherently 
personal.  It is tempting to dismiss an inherently personal ideal as 
irrelevant to law.  In this view, law simply focuses on outcomes–not 
modes of choice.  Yet philosophers of virtue have long contended that 
this highly personal mode of choice is critical to law and self-
governance. 
Aristotle believed the most proper and central role of government 
was to make its citizens virtuous.42  This was a practical belief: 
Aristotle did not view education in virtue as a way to “perfect men’s 
souls.”  Instead, he believed it necessary “to preserve actual imperfect 
regimes by fortifying citizens against the bad habits and destructive 
tendencies” that governments tended to, intentionally or not, 
cultivate.43  Aristotle believed that citizens needed “qualities of mind 
and character” that allowed them to effectively hold power in check 
for any government to survive.44  The only way citizens could 
consistently make right choices was to be trained in a virtuous mode 
of choice. 
At first blush, virtue may not appear to provide any guidance in the 
exercise of choice.  Aristotle, however, imagined that virtue required 
decision makers to seek out the “mean” in any given situation.  The 
mean is a baseline that makes it possible for virtue to provide 
practical guidance for action.45 
 
41 See STAN VAN HOOFT, UNDERSTANDING VIRTUE ETHICS 17 (2006) (“[W]hereas 
duty ethics conceives of moral motivation or practical necessity as obedience to rules, 
virtue ethics conceives of moral motivation or practical necessity as responsiveness to 
values.  An honest person values truth and if she finds herself in a situation where she 
might tell the truth or tell a lie to advantage herself, she will respond to the value that the 
truth holds for her.”). 
42 Robert P. George, The Central Tradition—Its Value and Limits, in VIRTUE 
JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3, at 24, 26. 
43 BERKOWITZ, supra note 30, at 11–12. 
44 Id. at 12. 
45 Defending virtue ethics from the charge that it does not and cannot provide any 
guidance as to right action, as opposed to the guidance provided by consequentialism and 
deontology, is the thesis of many scholars.  E.g., Rosalind Hursthouse, Normative Virtue 
Ethics, in HOW SHOULD ONE LIVE?: ESSAYS ON THE VIRTUES, supra note 3, at 19, 19–36.  
This charge is raised in support of the claim that virtue ethics is, in fact, not a normative 
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For Aristotle, most decisions involve choices situated along a 
spectrum.  On occasion, a person is faced with a clear choice between 
good and bad, but mostly an individual must make more nuanced 
choices.  Virtue involves making a choice between two extremes—
one of excess and one of deficiency.46  A virtue is not a single, 
universal good in opposition to a single, universal bad.  An example is 
bravery.  Bravery is the right choice or the mean between two 
opposite choices along the spectrum of fearfulness.  At one end is 
cowardice, which is the state of having too much fear (an excess), but 
the other end is rashness, which is the state of having too little fear (a 
deficiency).47  Bravery is the state in the middle.  So, a virtue is “just 
the right amount” of a particular trait, at a particular time, in a 
particular situation.48  Similarly, the virtue of justice in an economic 
exchange refers to the mean state in which each side has no more, and 
no less, than what is theirs as a result of the transaction.49 
C.  Focus on the Virtues Uniquely Relevant to Law: The Intellectual 
Virtues and the Virtue of Justice 
Intellectual virtue shares the Aristotelian stage with moral virtue, 
and justice is unique among all of the virtues.  Both the intellectual 
virtues and the virtue of justice are highly relevant to any discussion 
of virtue and law: the intellectual virtues embody how virtuous people 
should reason about problems, and justice requires that when one 
reasons about problems, consideration must be given to others also 
implicated by the issue. 
1.  The Intellectual Virtues 
The intellectual virtues are exercised in two ways, both by doing, 
through practical judgment, and by thinking, through 
contemplation.50  Phronesis, or practical wisdom, is street smarts—
 
rival to either consequentialism or deontology, which Hursthouse most assuredly believes 
is the case.  Id. 
46 ARISTOTLE, supra note 30, at 373 (“Virtue, then, is a mean, insofar as it aims at what 
is intermediate.”). 
47 D.S. Hutchinson, Ethics, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO ARISTOTLE 195, 217 
(Jonathan Barnes ed., 1995). 
48 ARISTOTLE, supra note 30, at 372 (“In everything continuous and divisible we can 
take more, less and equal, and each of them either in the object itself or relative to us; and 
the equal is some intermediate between excess and deficiency.”). 
49 See infra notes 65-74 and accompanying text. 
50 See BERKOWITZ, supra note 30, at 9-10. 
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wisdom both grand and gritty.  Practical wisdom is required for 
flourishing because without it one cannot determine right action.51 
Practical wisdom receives a good deal of attention in literature 
partly because phronesis seems to capture the interrelationship of 
means and ends.  Practical wisdom is the result of experiences built 
up over time.  These experiences in combination allow a person to 
exercise wisdom, though at the unconscious or intuitive level, which, 
in turn, leads to an appropriate judgment about how to respond to a 
practical dilemma.52  Aristotle defines practical wisdom as “‘a true 
and reasoned state of capacity to act with regard to the things that are 
good or bad for men.’”53 
2.  The Virtue of Justice 
The virtue of justice is at once a moral virtue and all of moral 
virtue.  Aristotle quotes a proverb to explain this special quality: “In 
Justice is all Virtue found in sum.”54 
Justice encompasses two different ideals: lawfulness and fairness 
or equality, in the sense of reciprocity rather than dignity.55  An 
unjust person is one who “breaks the law” or “takes more than his 
due.”56  As to the ideal of lawfulness, justice refers to laws that 
produce and preserve happiness of the community.57  As to the ideal 
of fairness or equality, “taking more than [one’s] due” may mean 
taking a larger share of a good thing than one is entitled, but it could 
also mean taking less of a bad thing.58  Justice is unique among the 
moral virtues because, while the many virtues can indirectly benefit 
 
51 Lawrence B. Solum, A Virtue-Centered Account of Equity and the Rule of Law, in 
VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3, at 142, 157 (“Phronesis is the ability to respond 
appropriately to the particular situation . . . .”). 
52 Id. at 157-58 (discussing phronesis and judging). 
53 Hutchinson, supra note 47, at 207. 
54 ARISTOTLE, supra note 1, at 259.  Aristotle also writes that justice is “the chief of the 
virtues, and more sublime ‘or than the evening or the morning star’ . . . .”  Id. 
55 Id. at 257.  Lawrence Solum has written about the dual nature of justice and 
concluded that justice as lawfulness (as opposed to fairness) is the “best contemporary 
expression of the natural law thesis that there is an essential connection between law and 
justice.”  Solum, supra note 51, at 191. 
56 ARISTOTLE, supra note 1, at 257. 
57 Id. at 259. 
58 Id. at 257. 
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others, justice alone always involves another person.59  In this way, 
justice always has a social aspect to it. 
In Aristotelian thinking, there are two kinds of justice–universal 
justice and particular justice.60  Universal justice is broad, meaning 
“the practice of virtue in general towards someone else.”61  Particular 
justice is more specific, meaning the proper distribution of goods, 
honor, or other objects that might bring others pleasure or pain.  
Particular justice has two components: distributive and corrective 
justice.  Distributive justice refers to the distribution of public benefits 
and burdens, and corrective justice refers to interactions between 
persons.  Corrective justice applies to both voluntary interactions, 
which correspond roughly with our modern idea of contract law,62 
and involuntary interactions, which correspond with our modern idea 
of criminal law.63 
For Aristotle, corrective justice requires a certain kind of equality 
in the transaction, called “arithmetic proportion.”64  Simply stated, 
arithmetic proportion means that private voluntary transactions result 
in “an equality of quantities.”65  At the end of a transaction, each 
side’s quantity must be the rightful one resulting from the 
 
59 Id. at 261.  (“Justice alone of the virtues is ‘the good of [the] others,’ because it does 
what is for the advantage of another, either a ruler or an associate.”). 
60 Id. at 263. 
61 Id. at 265. 
62 Despite the fact that the ancient Greek economy and our own are quite different, 
Aristotle’s list of representative transactions subject to the idea of corrective justice 
actually seems current: “selling, buying, lending at interest, pledging, lending without 
interest, depositing, [and] letting for hire.”  Id. at 267.  For the subject of different 
economies and what to make of that fact, see SCOTT MEIKLE, ARISTOTLE’S ECONOMIC 
THOUGHT 2–4 (1995), which notes the following: the Greeks did not have a market 
economy, but what to make of this fact is subject to debate in economic theory; there are 
comparatively few texts from that time to help sort it out (Aristotle’s writing in Book V of 
The Nicomachean Ethics is some of the most prolific of such literature); and the two sides 
of the debate are the “modernists,” who take the position that the ancient Greek economy 
is not dissimilar to ours in kind but only in scale and, thus, we should study the Greek 
economy using modern concepts and the “primitivists,” who argue that economic activity 
in ancient times was, in fact, different in kind than ours and, thus, the attempt to study the 
Greek economy using the tools of our market economy cannot succeed. 
63 ARISTOTLE, supra note 1, at 267. 
64 See Peter Benson, The Basis of Corrective Justice and Its Relation to Distributive 
Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 515, 538 (1992); see also ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF 
PRIVATE LAW 136 (noting that modern contract law requires corrective justice “[b]ecause 
a breach of the defendant’s duty is an infringement of the plaintiff’s right, the law requires 
the defendant, through expectation damages or specific performance, to place the plaintiff 
in the same position he or she would have been in if the contract had been performed”). 
65 WEINRIB, supra note 64, at 62. 
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transaction.66  The relative worthiness (by whatever possibly relevant 
criterion) of the parties does not matter.67  Moreover, corrective 
justice does not require an exchange of equivalents in value because 
corrective justice does not require that a transaction affirmatively 
produce some measure of equality between the parties.  Rather, a 
party should start with an owned quantity and end with an owned 
quantity—no more, no less.  In other words, “equality is a mean 
because the parties have neither more nor less than what is theirs.”68 
Aristotle’s conception of equality is not to be taken literally; it is 
more a form than a formula.69  Corrective justice is not satisfied if, at 
the end of a transaction, each party does not have what rightfully 
belongs to it.70  Corrective justice requires that a quantity wrongfully 
possessed by another at the end of a voluntary transaction be 
returned.71  In this way, Aristotle’s notion of “quantitative equality 
captures the basic feature of private law,” which is that “the 
defendant’s unjust gain [is] correlative to the plaintiff’s unjust loss.”72  
The point seems to be that, for Aristotle, corrective justice “ensures 
that transactions between two individuals do not introduce new 
inequalities.”73 
D.  What Virtue Is Not: Virtue Is Not Natural Law 
At this point, given the use of such terms as “moral virtue” and 
“right reason,” it may appear that virtue depends on the idea either 
that human beings have a particular nature or that law or human 
action must be justified by reference to some single, higher 
authority.74  Notwithstanding this commonly held misconception, 
Aristotle was not a “natural law” philosopher. 
 
66 Id. at 62–63. 
67 Benson, supra note 64, at 538–39. 
68 WEINRIB, supra note 64, at 63. 
69 Id. at 61 (“Aristotle’s identification of justice in holdings with equality does not 
imply that everyone’s holdings ought to be the same in quantity or value.  His point is 
formal.  Like equality, justice in holdings orders the relationship between distinct entities; 
like equality, justice in holdings is disturbed by excess or shortfall.  In maintaining that in 
every just arrangement the parties are equals, Aristotle is not committed to any particular 
set of holdings or to any particular criterion of equality.  Equality is merely a way of 
representing the norm that injustice violates.”). 
70 Id. at 63. 
71 Id. at 62. 
72 Id. at 63–64 (discussing the correlativity of modern contract law). 
73 Hutchinson, supra note 47, at 222. 
74 BERKOWITZ, supra note 30, at 8. 
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Natural law requires “the articulation of some basic human goods 
or needs that any system of positive law must respect, promote, or in 
any case protect.”75  In natural law, the term “natural right” denotes 
an appeal to a higher standard against which the judgments made by 
the members of the community are measured.76  By contrast, Aristotle 
uses the term “natural right” to mean something different.  
Aristotelian natural right is not an appeal to a higher substantive 
authority.77  Instead, it is a process right: it means that members of 
political communities make judgments about justice.78  Two virtuous 
people may reach different conclusions in the same situation, but both 
will engage in a particular decision-making process that features 
common intellectual and moral traits.79 
III 
A RENAISSANCE OF VIRTUE 
As discussed below, virtue jurisprudence—legal theory built on 
virtue—is a new idea.  In other parts of the academy, however, there 
is an existing buzz about virtue.  Scholars from across various 
 
75 Russell Hittinger, Natural Law and Virtue: Theories at Cross Purposes, in NATURAL 
LAW THEORY: CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS 42, 42 (Robert P. George ed., 1992). 
76 Bernard Yack, Natural Right and Aristotle’s Understanding of Justice, 18 POL. 
THEORY 216, 230 (1990). 
77 Id. at 231 (“Aristotle does not appeal to nature as a final standard against which to 
measure the justice of our laws and political judgments . . . .”). 
78 Id. at 230.  Yack writes: 
 The naturalness of Aristotelian natural right lies in the kind of judgment it 
describes rather than in the particular standards that it contains. . . . Natural right 
is natural in the same way that the political community is natural.  Like the polis, 
it develops, for the most part, when free and relatively equal individuals come 
together.  Moreover, judgments about natural right, like the political community 
itself, reflect and develop the highest practical capacity nature gives to human 
beings: their capacity to receive the training that promotes moral virtue and 
practical wisdom. 
Id. at 222 (footnote omitted).  That Aristotle does make problematic judgments about who 
is entitled to participate in political communities is widely noted and subjects Aristotle to 
right criticism.  See id. at 230.  Martha Nussbaum attributes these judgments to a bereft 
conception of the requirement of human dignity in Aristotelian philosophy.  Nussbaum, 
supra note 9, at 37 (“One of the great defects of Aristotle’s thought lies here. . . . What 
Aristotle seems to lack is the basic idea of human equality, of a worth all humans share 
across differences of gender, class, and ethnicity.”). 
79 See, e.g., Rosalind Hursthouse, Two Ways of Doing the Right Thing, in VIRTUE 
JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3, at 236, 236–55 (describing how virtue theory can help 
lawyers reason through situations in which it appears that there is no single “right” choice 
to be made). 
 2009] Virtue and Contract Law 721 
disciplines are revisiting virtue theory, and the conversations are 
robust, important, and gaining momentum.  Section A shows that 
intellectual historians are revisiting the work of the canonical political 
philosophers least identified with virtue—Hobbes, Locke, Mill, and 
Smith, for example.  While these philosophers categorically rejected 
the idea that the goal of a political state was, as Aristotle believed, 
promoting excellence through virtue, they believed that virtue was 
critical to maintaining political order and, later, freedom.  As 
understood by these thinkers, virtue is entirely consistent with what 
we now understand as political and economic liberalism.  Legal 
historians are joining the fray as they reveal spaces in law, both public 
and private, that are the direct intellectual descendants of Aristotle. 
Section B shows that contemporary theorists and philosophers like 
Martha Nussbaum are debating the return to virtue as moral and 
political theory.  When discussing law, these conversations focus on 
traditional public law subjects, such as constitutional law and political 
legitimacy. 
Section C, however, shows that in the last two years a new 
community of virtue theorists has surfaced.  These legal scholars view 
virtue with a decidedly practical eye, seeking to apply virtue theory to 
contemporary law.  This is the self-titled “virtue jurisprudence” 
movement.  Led by scholars like Lawrence Solum and Colin Farrelly, 
these writers apply virtue theory to various problems in areas of 
contemporary law, such as criminal law, constitutional law, tort law, 
and the law of lawyering.  Applied virtue jurisprudence is the newest 
of the conversations about virtue.80 
A.  Intellectual Historians and Aristotelian Influences 
Historians are taking up the call to explore Aristotelian influences 
on law.  Historians writing about virtue come in two stripes: those 
joining the conversation about political theory and those writing about 
doctrine in the legal academy.  Each group has made some powerful 
conclusions about virtue and law. 
1.  Political Historians 
Intellectual historians interested in virtue theory have revisited the 
political and philosophical ideas of the thinkers who influenced and 
 
80 Rebecca L. Walker & Phillip J. Ivanhoe, Introduction to WORKING VIRTUE: VIRTUE 
ETHICS AND CONTEMPORARY MORAL PROBLEMS, supra note 31, at 1, 2. 
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shaped contemporary liberalism, such as Hobbes, Locke, Mill, Smith, 
and Rousseau.  In the traditional reading of political philosophy, these 
thinkers were entirely opposed to any role for virtue in public life.  
Indeed, they were quite explicit in rejecting the Aristotelian idea that 
the most important function of the state was to promote virtue.  Yet 
this traditional reading masked the residual importance of virtue in 
these thinkers’ works.  Recently, several historians have revisited the 
role of virtue in these classic works, concluding that each author 
assumed that virtue would continue to play an important background 
role in effective citizenship.  These historians contend that a complete 
understanding of how important virtue was to these thinkers is 
missing. 81 
For example, in his book Virtue and the Making of Modern 
Liberalism, Peter Berkowitz demonstrates that we have lost track of 
the importance and influence that virtue had for these thinkers,82 
concluding that liberalism depends on virtue and always has: 
Indeed . . . the liberal tradition, through a variety of prominent 
spokesmen, affirms that maintenance of a political order capable of 
securing the personal freedom of all depends upon citizens and 
representatives capable of exercising a range of basic virtues.  
Liberalism . . . can no more do without virtue than a person on a diet 
can survive without food and drink.83 
Specifically, while these “prominent spokesmen” rejected multiple 
aspects of Aristotelian philosophy, including the notion that 
promotion of virtuous citizens was a proper goal of a liberal state, 
they did recognize and understand that a properly functioning state 
could not be maintained without virtues that would temper otherwise 
 
81 To be fair, it is no accident that some scholars have overlooked the connections 
between Enlightenment thinkers and virtue, as even the philosophers consciously 
distanced themselves from other aspects of Aristotelian thinking.  See, e.g., MICHAEL 
OAKESHOTT, THE CONCEPT OF A PHILOSOPHICAL JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS AND 
REVIEWS 1926–51, at 182 (Luke O’Sullivan ed., 2007) (“[P]hilosophers (Hobbes, for 
example) . . . appear anxious to detach themselves from the philosophic tradition; but 
Blake is as impossible without Shakespeare and Milton and much that he himself had 
never read, as Hobbes without Aristotle, Epicurus and Aquinas.”). 
82 Berkowitz adopts Judith Shklar’s definition of liberalism, “as a political doctrine the 
primary goal of which is ‘to secure the political conditions that are necessary for the 
exercise of personal freedom.’”  BERKOWITZ, supra note 30, at 4–5 (quoting JUDITH N. 
SHKLAR, The Liberalism of Fear, reprinted in POLITICAL THOUGHT AND POLITICAL 
THINKERS 3, 3 (Stanley Hoffmann ed., 1998)). 
83 Id. at 4. 
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uncontrollable self-interest.84  For example, while Hobbes (a 
“protoliberal”85) believed that the state should promote the power of 
sovereign over all, he also recognized that securing peace and order 
required virtuous citizens.86  This aspect of Hobbes’s thinking is quite 
often overlooked and, when it is uncovered, tends to be rather 
surprising.  One does not readily associate the man of authoritative, 
draconian Leviathan with squishy-sounding personal ideals like 
virtue.  Yet, though most scholars have overlooked this aspect of his 
work, Hobbes’s writing shows that in his view, state order was at least 
partially dependent on the state’s citizens having internalized the 
virtues of peace.87 
John Locke serves as another example.  Unlike Hobbes, Locke 
believed the basis of the state’s authority was the consent of the 
governed.  But like Hobbes, Locke believed that promoting virtue was 
not the proper end of state action.88  Nonetheless, he understood that 
virtues, both social and intellectual, were necessary for “the 
preservation of a political order.”89  Virtues required for public life 
include “self-denial, liberality, justice, courage, civility, industry, and 
truthfulness.”90 
Even John Stuart Mill, the author of On Liberty, was not a 
libertarian when it came to virtue.  It is true that he rejected virtue as 
 
84 See id. at 33–34 (“In sum, liberal democracy rests on an unstable equilibrium 
between the healthy liberal impulse to economize on virtue and the inescapable demand 
for some minimum of good character in citizens and officeholders.”); see also JAMES 
GORDLEY, THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN CONTRACT DOCTRINE 112 (1991) 
(stating that Hobbes and Locke rejected Aristotelian metaphysics, including the idea that 
objects had “a substantial form and a final cause or end”). 
85 BERKOWITZ, supra note 30, at 106. 
86 Id. at 36.  For example, Hobbes, who is easily characterized as downright anti-
Aristotelian, did recognize that if the goal of the state was nothing other than maintenance 
of peace and order, then the way to peace was the virtues of “[‘]justice, gratitude, modesty, 
equity, mercy, and the rest of the laws of nature.[’]”  Id. at 38, 38 n.19 (emphasis omitted) 
(quoting THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 117 (Barnes & Noble Books 2004) (1651)). 
87 Id. at 39 (“[Thus,] how the moral virtues arise and what can be done to foster them 
comes into focus as more critical to his thought than the questions that have recently 
preoccupied so many scholars concerning political obligation or how the laws of nature 
can be binding.”). 
88 See, e.g., id. at 4 (explaining that virtue was rejected as the goal for politics in the 
Enlightenment: “Instead of seeking through politics to promote human perfection, the 
liberal tradition came to understand the goal of politics as the protection of personal 
freedom.  The liberal tradition embraces freedom as the aim of politics on the grounds that 
it is both more attainable and more just than the promotion of virtue.”). 
89 Id. at 77. 
90 Id. at 105. 
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an explicit aspiration of government.  But Mill’s writing “explicitly 
calls attention to those lesser qualities of mind and character 
necessary to the maintenance of political society, qualities that Mill 
refers to as ‘social virtues,’” and, consistent with Aristotle, “argues 
that the primary means for preserving a political regime is through 
education in the virtues.”91 
Perhaps the most surprising historical work focuses on another of 
liberalism’s founding fathers, Adam Smith.  Adam Smith may be best 
known as the father of the principle of freedom of contract—
emerging from the “invisible hand” theory of the free market.  Indeed, 
Smith’s reputation as an economic libertarian is so ubiquitous that it 
has been said “some . . . seem to believe [Adam Smith] is alive and 
well and living in retirement at the University of Chicago.”92  
According to the standard account of Smith, the state’s only concern 
is maximizing individual freedom (in service of wealth 
maximization), but this reputation is based on incomplete 
information. 
What is less well-known about Smith, but arguably just as 
important, is the fact that he also believed markets had to be fair to 
work properly.93  Free markets were not an end in and of themselves; 
instead, free markets were desirable because they produce “[‘]greater 
individual and social utility, wealth, efficiency and fairness[—] . . . [a 
free market] is a just institution.’”94  Smith thought the common good 
depended on just markets and governments properly regulated 
markets when they operated unjustly.95 
Further, Smith expressly equated virtue with excellence.96  Perhaps 
most surprisingly, he believed that the common good was a priority in 
a well-ordered society and that the economic man is also a social 
man.97  In fact, Adam Smith opens The Theory of Moral Sentiments 
by observing the economic man’s cooperative “tendencies toward 
 
91 Id. at 137. 
92 Stein, supra note 10, at 621. 
93 Larry A. DiMatteo, The History of Natural Law Theory: Transforming Embedded 
Influences into a Fuller Understanding of Modern Contract Law, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 839, 
878 (1999) (“Adam Smith’s properly functioning free market was one that not only 
produced economic efficiency, but one that ensured fairness and justice.”). 
94 Id. (quoting Donald J. Devine, Adam Smith and the Problem of Justice in Capitalist 
Society, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 406 (1977)). 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 880 (noting that in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith wrote, “Virtue is 
excellence”). 
97 Id. at 879–80. 
 2009] Virtue and Contract Law 725 
sympathy and benevolence: ‘How selfish soever man may be 
supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which 
interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness 
necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the 
pleasure of seeing it.’”98 
Work of this sort has also uncovered insights into another 
Enlightenment political theorist, Jean-Jacques Rousseau.  Rousseau is 
known for the social-contract ideal: people could be trusted to 
cooperate without any civic education in character or morals when it 
came to matters of self-governance—because of a natural alignment 
of incentives.  People must cooperate to self-govern; without 
cooperation, self-governance is not possible.  Their interests are 
naturally aligned.  But, what is less well-known about Rousseau is 
that he also thought that people could not be trusted to conduct 
themselves properly in financial markets in the same way without 
some civic education in virtue—because of a misalignment of 
incentives.99  To gain financially, people necessarily must not 
cooperate.  If they cooperate, they will lose out.  Their interests are 
naturally misaligned. 
Rousseau’s worry was the modern market economy would produce 
a “society of smiling enemies.”100 “[T]he modern commercial 
republic, generating sociability from selfishness, necessarily creates a 
society of smiling enemies, where each individual pretends to care 
about others precisely because he cares only about himself.”101  
Rousseau was so concerned about the harm that could result from this 
tendency of human nature that he placed an extremely high value on 
sincerity, finding it critical to self-actualization: “Rousseau argues 
that sincerity is the highest good in life because it is the essential path 
to genuine selfhood and self-realization.  What piety is for St. 
Augustine, what contemplation is for Plato, sincerity is for 
Rousseau.”102 
 
98 Heidi Li Feldman, Prudence, Benevolence, and Negligence: Virtue Ethics and Tort 
Law, in VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3, at 51, 62. 
99 See Arthur M. Melzer, Rousseau and the Modern Cult of Sincerity, HARV. REV. 
PHIL., Spring 1995, at 7–8. 
100 Id. at 10. 
101 Id. (noting that Rousseau was concerned about hypocrisy generated by economic 
life, not by political life). 
102 Id. at 15. 
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2.  Legal Historians: Influences in Contract Law Doctrine 
Legal historians have capitalized on the work done by political 
historians to add to our understanding of the law.  For example, James 
Gordley has written extensively on the ways in which contract law is 
indebted to classical virtue theory.103  The insights he uncovers are 
certainly provocative and warrant further attention from scholars, 
especially in light of the chorus of scholarly voices starting to emerge 
around the subject of virtue. 
For example, in The Philosophical Origins of Modern Contract 
Doctrine, Gordley looks at the ancient historical antecedents to 
modern contract law in search of the role of virtue.104  He argues that 
the modern common law of contract is, at its core, based on the work 
of the late scholastics, who fused what would become the basis of the 
modern European civil codes and the common law with classical 
Greek and Thomistic philosophies.105  For Gordley, this synthesis 
shows that there are little understood, but critical, virtue-based 
premises embedded in our contemporary contract law.106  Gordley 
contends that various virtue-based principles have survived largely 
intact in the law through a long history of doctrinal evolution,107 but 
the Aristotelian ideas on which the law was based fell away in the 
Enlightenment.  Gordley argues that when the philosophy was 
severed from the doctrine in this time period, contract theory was left 
with many gaps—gaps that contemporary contracts theorists are still 
trying to fill.108  One problem with this effort is, without historical 
mooring, contemporary theorists fill these gaps with competing 
 
103 See, e.g., GORDLEY, supra note 84; see also DiMatteo, supra note 93, at 840–43 
(characterizing much of the Aristotelian influences as natural law seemingly by using 
Aquinas’s work as a jumping-off point). 
104 GORDLEY, supra note 84, at 3 (asserting the thesis and defining “late scholastics” as 
a “small group of theologians and jurists” in Spain during the sixteenth and early 
seventeenth centuries). 
105 Id. at 107–08. 
106 Id. at 108.  This is consistent with DiMatteo’s conclusion that Aristotelian influences 
in the modern common law of contract can be traced to two primary ideas: just exchange 
and contractual essence.  See DiMatteo, supra note 93, at 847, 860–61. 
107 See GORDLEY, supra note 84, at 69–111 (accounting for precisely what aspects of 
contract law were absorbed into various doctrines and principles, including the binding 
force of promises, offer and acceptance, duress, mistake and fraud, equality in exchange, 
type of contract, and natural terms). 
108 Id. at 121 (noting that this severance of moral philosophy from legal doctrine is part 
of the reason that current contract theory seems to lack philosophical coherence). 
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philosophical ideas, which only serve to exacerbate the holes.109  
Gordley seems to suggest that if contemporary theorists better 
understood the connection between current contract law and its 
Aristotelian origins, then contract theory’s gaps would naturally close. 
For example, Gordley argues that the principle that contracts 
should be interpreted to effectuate what the parties themselves 
actually intended originated with Aristotelian philosophy.110  
Gordley’s work traces this fundamental premise of contract 
interpretation to the Aristotelian concept of obligations having 
“natural terms.”111  For Aristotle, the contracting parties’ intent was 
furthered by holding the parties to the terms “natural” to the type (or 
essence) of obligation they assumed.112  On Gordley’s view, existing 
gaps between the various theories of contract interpretation could be 
narrowed by recalling the doctrine’s Aristotelian origins.113 
B.  Contemporary Legal Theorists and Aristotelian Influences 
Much of the nascent legal theory work in virtue focuses on 
constitutional law.  One legal philosopher writing in the field of law 
and virtue is Martha Nussbaum.  Nussbaum promotes a capabilities 
 
109 Id. at 230–31. 
110 Id. at 161–62. 
111 Id. at 102–11.  The idea of natural terms was itself based on the Roman legal 
practice of classifying obligations into various types, each of which had different rules to 
determine at what point in time the obligation became binding.  Id. at 30–31.  In Roman 
law, different types of obligations could be identified according to their ends; an obligation 
was classified as one type or another based on the purpose for which it was undertaken.  
Id. at 61–65. 
112 Id. at 108. 
113 Some legal historians have reached conclusions about the doctrine that are consistent 
with Gordley’s thought.  See, e.g., DiMatteo, supra note 93, at 892, 895 (writing that 
“[e]quitable contract is in essence the implementation of Aristotelian corrective justice and 
Thomistic commutative justice,” and that Thomistic natural law philosophy is embedded 
in equitable principles of unconscionability doctrine, in principles of contract 
interpretation, and in the concept of promissory estoppel, among other places).  Some 
differ.  See, e.g., Morton J. Horwitz, The Historical Foundations of Modern Contract Law, 
87 HARV. L. REV. 917, 952 (1974) (“The entire conceptual apparatus of [the will theory 
of] modern contract doctrine—rules dealing with offer and acceptance, the evidentiary 
function of consideration, and canons of construction and interpretation—arose to 
articulate the will theory with which American doctrinal writers expressed the ideology of 
a market economy in the early nineteenth century.”).  Horwitz thinks that modern contract 
law arose to express the ideology of the new market economy, and so presumably, this 
area of law is organized accordingly.  See id.  To the extent that law and economics is the 
dominant theoretical paradigm in contract, Horwitz’s version of the narrative is more 
generally accepted as the standard account. 
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approach (CA) to constitutional law and theory.114  The CA derives 
its intellectual power largely from the Aristotelian tradition.115 
Under the CA, the goal of a constitution and the government 
interpreting it is to empower citizens to make choices that will allow 
them to secure a life “worthy of human dignity . . . in areas of central 
importance to human life.”116  The idea is that “many of the most 
central human capabilities, given their enormous importance to basic 
social justice, should be placed beyond majority whim through 
constitutionally protected status.”117 
Indeed, in her historical account of the CA, Nussbaum writes that it 
was the product of John Stuart Mill and T.H. Green, who themselves 
were “strongly influenced by Aristotelian ideas.”118  These thinkers 
believed in the Aristotelian ideal that government should “aim at 
producing capabilities or opportunities” for citizens to make choices 
leading to a flourishing life.119  Like Aristotle, these thinkers believed 
that government should not require that its citizens perform certain 
“desirable activities.”120  Instead, Mill and Green believed that a 
person is only virtuous (and so can only flourish) when making 
choices about right action, and so the government’s highest function 
is to make laws that best position citizens to make those choices when 
opportunities arise.121  Similarly, a government that enables its 
citizens to be able to achieve the “good life” is at the heart of the 
contemporary CA. 
 
114 She is not an Aristotelian herself but is an expert in the subject.  See Martha 
Nussbaum, Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach, in THE QUALITY OF LIFE 
242, 244 (Martha C. Nussbaum and Amartya Sen eds., 1993).  As noted below, her work 
reconciles the relativist objection to Aristotle’s work.  See infra note 168 and 
accompanying text. 
115 Nussbaum, supra note 9, at 33. 
116 Id. at 7. 
117 Id. at 56. 
118 Id. at 8.  Nussbaum writes, 
The political and ethical thought of Aristotle is the primary source for the CA.     
. . . 
 Because choice is all-important for Aristotle—no action is counted as virtuous 
in any way, unless it is mediated by a person’s own thought and selection . . . he 
does not instruct politicians to make everyone perform desirable activities.  
Instead, they are to aim at producing capabilities or opportunities. 
Id. at 33 (footnotes omitted). 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 33–34. 
 2009] Virtue and Contract Law 729 
Another legal theorist currently applying Aristotelian ideals to 
constitutional law is Lawrence Solum.  In his recent piece, The 
Aretaic Turn in Constitutional Theory,122 Solum concludes that the 
contemporary Supreme Court is too driven by politics and 
insufficiently driven by principle.123  He argues that the best way to 
restore principle to constitutional law is to make “an aretaic turn” in 
constitutional theory.124  Like Nussbaum, Solum believes both that 
Aristotelian principles are the best normative basis for constitutional 
law and that, as a matter of description, these principles are already 
embedded in the best law and legal theory.125 
Examples of this kind of theory work are staring to emerge in other 
places in the legal academy as well.  For example, one writer has 
examined the phrase “you should have known better,” which is 
suggested by much legal reasoning, from three normative 
perspectives instead of the usual two: corrective justice (Aristotelian), 
Kantianism (deontological), and utilitarianism (law and 
economics).126  These examples demonstrate that legal theorists are 
now beginning to take note of Aristotelian theory and to account for 
that theory in their analyses. 
C.  Applied Law and Virtue, or “Virtue Jurisprudence” 
Thus far, this Article has explained the developing importance of 
virtue in the fields of political and legal history and theory.  Other 
than the historical effort on doctrine, this work is expressly designed 
to operate at a high level of abstraction.  But law is ultimately played 
out in particular doctrinal spaces.  Until recently, virtue theory had 
never been applied practically to contemporary law.  Several legal 
scholars collaborated precisely on that project: developing an applied 
 
122 Lawrence B. Solum, The Aretaic Turn in Constitutional Theory, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 
475 (2005). 
123 Id. at 477. 
124 Id. at 477–78. 
125 Id. at 478; Nussbaum, supra note 9, at 56–73 (describing constitutional law 
decisions that utilize an approach similar to CA in their reasoning, including the following: 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (free exercise); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 
(1967) (equal protection and race); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (equal 
protection and gender); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (procedural due process 
and termination of welfare benefits); and Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (education)). 
126 Bailey Kuklin, “You Should Have Known Better,” 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 545, 576 
(2000); see also Ronald J. Colombo, Ownership, Limited: Reconciling Traditional and 
Progressive Corporate Law via an Aristotelian Understanding of Ownership, 34 J. CORP. 
L. 247 (2008). 
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“virtue jurisprudence.”  Thus far, this work has been embodied in a 
single anthology, Virtue Jurisprudence,127 which features nine essays 
applying virtue theory to different areas of law.  Colin Farrelly and 
Lawrence Solum assert, in an introductory essay, that virtue can affect 
the content of law (what should the aim of law be?) and that virtue 
can affect the way law is implemented (what should legal institutions 
look like?).128 
Unfortunately, Virtue Jurisprudence leaves many questions 
unanswered.  The various authors do not systematically address how 
virtue is to “create the conditions for human flourishing” through 
law.129  As the volume seems to be the only one of its kind addressing 
virtue jurisprudence, the contours of the relationship between law and 
virtue remain murky.  What are the ways in which law should account 
for virtue?  At a systematic level, what does virtue theory do for our 
understanding of law?  What can society and citizens expect if courts 
and lawmakers were to “adopt” virtue theory?  A starting point in the 
answer is, of course, that virtue jurisprudence is not thought 
control.130  However, in order to know what virtue can do for law, 
one must know how virtue relates to law. 
The existing applied law and virtue analysis does not explicitly 
take up the relationship question.  The virtue jurisprudence 
scholarship does suggest common themes, among them the ideas that 
virtue can provide guidance to legal decision makers, including 
lawyers and judges;131 that virtue can help shape legal institutions;132 
 
127 See generally VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3. 
128 Farrelly & Solum, supra note 3, at 2. 
129 Id. at 6 (referring to this strategy as a “bottom-up” approach). 
130 Koller, supra note 31, at 197 (writing that virtue theory does not support the notion 
that law should be used to enforce or control “inner convictions, attitudes, and virtues[, as] 
using [law] for this purpose unavoidably would turn it into an instrument of terror”). 
131 There are three examples of this relationship in Virtue Jurisprudence.  One is 
Suzanna Sherry’s essay.  See generally Suzanna Sherry, Judges of Character, in VIRTUE 
JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3, at 88.  The second is Lawrence Solum’s essay.  See 
generally Solum, supra note 51.  These two essays focus on the need for judges to make 
decisions based on norms of virtue, which are universal, and not based on politics, which 
is relative.  A third example examines the relationship between virtue and law from the 
perspective of practicing lawyers.  In Two Ways of Doing the Right Thing, Rosalind 
Hursthouse focuses on how good lawyers faced with only bad choices can do the virtuous 
thing.  See generally Hursthouse, supra note 79. 
132 Legal institutions can and should be structured around norms of virtue.  In Civic 
Liberalism and the “Dialogical Model” of Judicial Review, Colin Farrelly argues that 
judicial review should be remade to resolve the “Madisonian dilemma”—the tension 
between a desire for limited government (liberalism) and for self-government 
(constitutionalism)–and that virtue is the normative basis for the overhaul.  See generally 
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and that virtue can help courts give content to broad legal 
standards.133  The next Part begins the process of explaining what 
virtue jurisprudence might mean in a context no author has yet 
explored: contract law.  Taking a cue from those scholars who 
christened the field, the next Part focuses on one particular sort of 
“action advice”: how virtue might help courts give content to broad 
legal standards in contract law. 
IV 
VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE AND CONTRACT LAW 
Building a practical legal theory on virtue may seem like a lofty 
goal.  The new virtue jurisprudence scholarship attempts to do just 
that.  While virtually all existing virtue jurisprudence work has 
focused on public law concepts—constitutional law, criminal law, the 
law of lawyering, tort law (as a quasi-public, quasi-private subject)—
this Part makes a new move, applying this approach to the private law 
of contracts. 
The initial focus on public law is intuitively comfortable.  As 
shown in the historical accounts, virtue has been most considered—
sometimes accepted, sometimes rejected—in the context of public 
institutions.  For example, Aristotle believed that a person’s highest 
and best function, participating in the polis, required virtue and that 
the state should therefore actively educate its citizens in virtue.134  
 
Colin Farrelly, Civic Liberalism and the “Dialogical Model” of Judicial Review, in 
VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3, at 107. 
133 There are three examples of this relationship in Virtue Jurisprudence.  First, in 
Prudence, Benevolence, and Negligence: Virtue Ethics and Tort Law, Heidi Li Feldman 
writes that virtue currently exists in the reasonable person standard used in negligence law.  
Feldman, supra note 98, at 51.  Her thesis is that reasonableness is only one part of a three-
part standard, which incorporates virtues of due care (prudence) and caring (benevolence).  
Id.  Feldman’s idea is that 
[t]ort law assesses negligence according to the conduct of a reasonable person of 
ordinary prudence who acts with due care for the safety of others. . . . It is 
mistaken to reduce negligence to reasonableness or to try to understand the sense 
of reasonableness contemplated by the negligence standard without reference to 
the virtues of prudence and benevolence. 
Id.  Second, on the subject of virtue and the theory of criminal law, Antony Duff and 
Kyron Huigens offer competing answers to the question of whether virtue can explain or 
justify punishment.  Compare Antony Duff, Virtue, Vice, and Criminal Liability, in 
VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3, at 193, 193–213, with Kyron Huigens, On 
Aristotelian Criminal Law: A Reply to Duff, in VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3, at 
214, 214–35. 
134 See supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text. 
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Even the scholars who explicitly rejected virtue as the primary 
function of the state thought that, without virtuous citizens, the state 
could not function well. 
Notwithstanding the intuitive attraction of applying virtue to public 
law, there are good reasons to introduce and consider it in the private 
law context also.  As suggested above, contract has certain features 
that virtue is particularly well suited to address: contract is a dual 
institution, both economic and social, and contract is based on intent.  
Virtue theory is better suited to analyze the dual dimensions of the 
institution of contract because, unlike consequentialism and 
deontology, this theory has an analytical focus on both the means and 
ends of law.  Precisely because of the match between virtue theory’s 
dual nature and contract’s dual dimensions, virtue theory will better 
capture the single most foundational concept in contract: the parties’ 
intent.  This Part returns to that claim to explore it in more depth. 
A.  A Means-Ends Approach Would Capture Both the Economic and 
Social Dimensions of Contract 
Legal scholars often divide law into two types of fields, private and 
public.  Public law involves all those doctrines that regulate an 
individual’s relationship with the state.  Private law includes doctrines 
that regulate individuals’ relationships with each other.  Contract is 
often considered the paradigm of private law.  In this reductionist 
scheme, many legal scholars overlook the public dimensions of 
private law institutions, like contract.  One of the public dimensions 
of contract is that the process of exchange creates a relationship 
between the contracting parties.  To be sure, most contracts are not 
designed to create a social relationship—most contracts are entered 
into primarily to maximize wealth through a process of exchange. 
Recently, some contract theorists, such as Daniel Markovits and 
Rob Kar, have returned to contract’s social aspects.135  The social 
aspects of contract arise merely from the fact that any private 
transaction creates some form of relationship between the contracting 
parties.136  Given this recent renewed attention on contract’s social 
dimensions, it seems like the right time to begin talking about how 
virtue theory might apply to contract. 
 
135 See supra notes 4, 21 and accompanying text.  Contract’s “relational” aspects were 
first studied seriously beginning with the “relational” theory of the late sixties and early 
seventies.  See Feinman, supra note 22, at 1299–1304 (describing relational theory). 
136 Markovits, supra note 21, at 1419–20. 
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The reason that virtue theory is an appropriate lens for thinking 
about contract is that the theory may help courts identify the parties’ 
intent in contract better than either economics or rights analysis alone.  
A key premise here is that contracting parties may have intent as to 
both the means and the ends of their deals.  Yet, existing approaches 
privilege one over the other, leaving courts unable to fully account for 
the totality of the parties’ intent. 
For example, consider intent as to “ends” in contract.  The parties’ 
intent as to the end of the deal will often be that the parties intended 
the deal to leave both better off than if there were no exchange.  This 
is a highly individualist approach to thinking of contract and 
conceives of contract as a purely economic institution.  This is also 
familiar territory: law and economics approaches to contract law are 
built on this idea. 
Now consider “intent as to means.”  “Intent as to means” refers to 
how contracting parties intended to treat each other through their 
conduct.  For example, the parties might have intended that each 
would treat the other respectfully or that a promise should be kept 
under certain conditions but could be excused under different 
conditions.  Deontological approaches focus the intent analysis here; 
as such, the ends of the contract become merely a derivative matter.  
But it is hard to imagine talking about contract law without 
recognizing that an important part of the contracting relationship is 
that parties agree in order to increase their wealth; otherwise, there 
would be no deal.  Perhaps this is why deontological theories have 
had such a hard time getting traction in scholarly debates about 
contract law. 
As a result, neither theory allows for the complete consideration of 
intentions.137  Current approaches do not allow for the kind of 
nuanced analysis of means and ends that would account for intentions 
as to both, but virtue theory does.  Virtue theory does not prioritize 
means over ends or vice versa.  It requires an interrelated analysis of 
both (at its core, this is the requirement of practical wisdom).138  This, 
in turn, may allow for a more complete accounting of contract as both 
an economic and a social institution. 
 
137 If the parties intend something else, they are always free to say so. 
138 See infra Part IV.C.1. 
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B.  Capturing Both Dimensions of Contract Would Improve Analysis 
of Parties’ Intent 
“What did the parties intend?” is a foundational question in 
contract law.  Questions over what the parties intended are often 
litigated, and these questions surface around the issues of contract 
interpretation and implied terms.139  Issues in contract interpretation 
arise when the parties choose a term but later realize they did not 
agree as to what the term meant.  Issues around implied terms arise 
when the parties fail to include a term that becomes relevant later. 
Courts applying the analytical tools of law and economics assume 
that the parties’ intent will be uncovered by applying the norm of 
efficiency.140  To do so, courts use various economic interpretive 
tools and methods, including “contextualism,” which requires a court 
to assume that the relevant community provides insight into what 
these specific parties intended, and joint maximization, which 
requires a court to assume that what the parties wanted was a bigger 
piece of the pie for themselves.141  On the other hand, courts inclined 
to follow a rights-based approach assume that the parties’ intent will 
be found in values other than efficiency, such as the value of the 
promise either as a promise for performance or because the parties 
consented to the promise.142  Notably, under both of the dominant 
approaches, courts assume that the parties intended either efficiency 
or promise keeping, but not both. 
This binary approach may not capture what is actually happening 
between contracting parties.  What if actual contracting parties are as 
likely, if not more likely, to imagine that they are contracting by 
reference to norms of both efficiency and promise keeping at the 
same time?  It should not be surprising if contracting parties have a 
more complex conception about contractual intent than currently 
 
139 See, e.g., George M. Cohen, Implied Terms and Interpretation in Contract Law, in 3 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 78, 79 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De 
Geest eds., 2000) (noting that “[i]n some sense, all contract disputes involve questions of 
interpretation and implied terms”). 
140 See, e.g., Patton v. Mid-Continent Sys., Inc., 841 F.2d 742, 750–51 (7th Cir. 1988). 
141 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 139, at 83 (noting that there are two presumptions that 
courts apply to incomplete contracts: contextualism, which refers to a standard external to 
the contract, and joint maximization, which refers to what rational, hypothetical parties 
would have intended under low transaction costs). 
142 See, e.g., Cates Constr., Inc. v. Talbot Partners, 980 P.2d 407, 431 (Cal. 1999) 
(Mosk, J., dissenting) (“But when a contract exists primarily to provide one party certainty 
and security in a risky enterprise, the other party’s bad faith breach cannot be efficient, 
because it negates the very purpose of the contract.”). 
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assumed.143  Adam Smith believed that a free market was not an end 
in itself; rather, a free market was desirable because it was free and 
just.144  Perhaps contracting parties have similarly nuanced ideas 
about contractual intent: perhaps parties want to justly maximize 
wealth. 
The idea that contracting parties could have “two heads” about 
what they want out of their deals—an increase in wealth, justly—may 
sound odd to lawyers and, at least, to nondeontological legal scholars, 
but the idea resonates with nonlawyers.  In a recent empirical study 
designed to test whether laypersons associate breach of contract with 
moral culpability, subjects were given different sets of facts 
describing more or less morally culpable breaching behavior.145  In 
one part of the study, subjects were told that a party breached a 
contract in order to take advantage of another, more profitable 
opportunity (“breach to gain”).146  In another part of the study, 
subjects were told a party breached a contract in order to avoid 
unanticipated loss (“breach to avoid loss”).147  Despite being 
instructed that the law would not differentiate between these two 
situations, subjects nonetheless adjusted damages awards upward in 
the breach to gain situation, relative to the breach to avoid loss 
situation.148  Subjects also adjusted damages awards upward when 
they were told that the breaching party failed to give the other side 
warning and, thus, failed to provide the other side an opportunity to 
discuss next steps before the breach.149 
This research concludes that nonlawyers attribute different levels 
of moral culpability to breach based on the breaching party’s conduct 
in the relationship: study participants were concerned about both the 
reason given for the breach and whether the defaulting party 
discussed the pending default with the other side before the breach.150  
This conclusion means that the moral intuition about why a contract 
 
143 See generally, e.g., David Baumer & Patricia Marschall, Willful Breach of Contract 
for the Sale of Goods: Can the Bane of Business Be an Economic Bonanza?, 65 TEMP. L. 
REV. 159 (1992) (cited in Perillo, supra note 25, at 1105 (noting that “[t]he business 
community rejects efficiency as an excuse for willful breaches”)). 
144 See supra notes 93–97 and accompanying text. 
145 Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron, supra note 2, at 405. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. at 420–21. 
149 Id. at 421. 
150 See id. at 413–17. 
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was breached (do the means fit the ends and vice versa?) matters to 
laypeople.  Though the study’s authors dismissed this result as not 
entirely “rational,” the idea apparently makes sense to laypeople.151  
If it makes sense to laypeople, it presumably makes sense to 
contracting parties themselves, who are often business people 
untrained in law.152 
To be sure, economics does not utterly fail to account for the ways 
that parties treat each other, nor do rights theories utterly fail to 
account for the desire to make money.  Law and economics scholars 
would probably say that the right way to treat each other is by 
respecting the norm of efficiency: if a party does what is efficient, the 
party will be doing the right thing.  In that way, economics theory 
privileges the end of efficiency; the means are derivative of the ends.  
The same could be said in reverse as to deontological theories: rights-
based contract theories do not absolutely preclude the idea that parties 
intend to maximize welfare when they enter a contract, but 
deontological approaches seem to privilege the norm of promise 
keeping in a way that marginalizes efficiency.  Virtue theory, with its 
symbiotic emphasis on both means and ends, has the capacity to 
better capture both. 
C.  Putting Means-Ends Intent Analysis to Work 
There are two spaces in contract law where courts routinely engage 
with the idea of parties’ intent: filling in “reasonableness” terms and 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
1.  Reasonableness Terms and Virtue Theory 
One place where virtue theory could enrich the analysis of parties’ 
intent in contracts cases occurs when the court must define the open-
ended term “reasonable.”  This subsection argues that when courts 
must give content to a “reasonableness” term, three tools of virtue 
theory could help better capture parties’ intent as to both means and 
ends of the deal than current theories allow.  These tools are practical 
reason, the notion of the mean, and corrective justice.  Indeed, in 
some instances, it seems that some courts are already using the ideas 
behind these tools, though no court explicitly couches their analysis in 
the terms of virtue theory. 
 
151 Id. at 420–23. 
152 See, e.g., Baumer & Marschall, supra note 143, at 160–61. 
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Sometimes in a contract, parties expressly agree to an open-ended 
“reasonableness” term (i.e., “we agree that delivery should be made 
within a reasonable time”), but later dispute what they meant by 
“reasonable.”  Other times, contract law directs the court to fill a gap 
in an agreement with a “reasonable” term (e.g., although the parties 
failed to specify a delivery date, the court determines that the parties 
did intend an enforceable agreement).153  Giving content to a 
reasonableness term, whether the term is express or implied, is an 
interpretive challenge for courts.154 
Under an economics approach, the court assumes the essence of a 
contract is the end of wealth maximization.155  Cases decided under 
this approach make it seem as though there is no room for debate over 
that idea.156  Similarly, under a rights-based approach, the court 
assumes that the essence of a contract is the means of promise 
keeping.157  Virtue theory would require that a court first inquire into 
the totality of the parties’ intent before analyzing intent as to any 
specific term.  In other words, a court would begin any inquiry into 
the meaning of any specific “reasonableness” term by inquiring into 
the parties’ goals for both the means and the ends of the contract.  
Virtue theory would allow—indeed, require—courts to be open to 
either possibility or to a combination of both. 
This kind of inquiry would put the Aristotelian principle of 
contractual “essence” to work.  Courts would fill gaps and resolve 
ambiguities by reference to the terms that would be “natural” to the 
essence of the contract.  Basically, courts today are doing a version of 
this—determining ultimately what the parties would have intended 
but basing the analysis on what seems “reasonable,” not on what 
seems “natural.”158  Yet under either of the two dominant approaches, 
 
153 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202(5) (1981) (“Wherever 
reasonable . . . consistent with each other and with . . . usage of trade.”); id. § 204 (“When 
the parties . . . have not agreed . . . a term which is reasonable . . . is supplied by the 
court.”); id. § 204 cmt. d (“But where there is in fact no agreement, the court should 
supply a term which comports with community standards of fairness and policy rather than 
analyze a hypothetical model of the bargaining process.”); id. § 209 (“[R]easonably 
appears to be a complete agreement . . . .”); id. § 222 (“[U]sage of trade . . . .”); U.C.C. § 
2-309 (2002) (“The time for shipment or delivery . . . shall be a reasonable time.”). 
154 See Cohen, supra note 139, at 82–83. 
155 See infra notes 24–28 and accompanying text. 
156 See generally Patton v. Mid-Continent Sys., Inc., 841 F.2d 742 (7th Cir. 1988). 
157 See supra notes 25–27 and accompanying text. 
158 Some private law scholars in other areas have suggested robust definitions of 
reasonableness that are consistent with virtue theory.  For an example in tort, Gregory 
Keating defined reasonableness as “fair cooperation” as opposed to the dominant frame of 
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courts start the intent analysis by assuming the answer to the very 
question that virtue theory would ask first.  The Aristotelian approach 
would not radically change the way courts analyze parties’ intent as to 
reasonableness terms.  It would simply open the possibility that the 
parties may have harbored intent as to both the means and the ends of 
the contract, which, in turn, could help courts better understand what 
any specific term, like a “reasonable delivery date,” meant. 
Virtue theory abounds with tools that could enrich our 
understanding of the dual nature of parties’ intent, including the 
means-ends approach of practical reason.  This approach contends 
both that virtues are modes of practical choice tied to the concept of 
the mean and that corrective justice requires that the parties not 
introduce new inequalities into the existing relationship. 
For an example, one can consider practical reason.  “[V]irtue 
ethicists associate practical wisdom . . . with the identification and 
efficacious pursuit of ordinary goals such as wealth or prosperity, 
convenience, and saving time—the sort of goals that animate our 
everyday acts . . . .”159  A court considering how to give specific 
content to an open-ended reasonableness standard would assume only 
that the parties each had some intent about both the ends of the 
contract as well as the means.160  A court considering how to give 
specific content to an open-ended reasonableness term would 
therefore analyze two inquiries: what was the intent as to ends, and 
what was the intent as to how those ends would be pursued.  In other 
words, the court would consider how the relationship should function 
(i.e., the means) in order to achieve “wealth or prosperity, 
convenience, and saving time.”  In this way, under a virtue theory 
approach, a court could more explicitly account for the parties’ intent 
as to means, as well as ends, of the contract.  Of course, as with any 
question of parties’ intent, the party with the burden of proof on a 
particular matter has to meet it through competent evidence—courts 
do not become roving truth commissions under a virtue theory 
approach any more than under an economic or rights-based approach. 
Additionally, consider the nature of the mean in Aristotelian 
thinking.  As with practical reasoning, contract analysis requires 
contextual judgment.  In Aristotelian philosophy, the mean is always 
 
“rationality.”  Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 
48 STAN. L. REV. 311, 379 (1996). 
159 Feldman, supra note 98, at 59. 
160 Parties that did not have this intent could explicitly say so in the contract and, thus, 
opt out of virtue jurisprudence. 
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contextual: what might be the right amount of bravery in one situation 
may be an excess, or a deficiency, in other.  Consistent with the mean, 
the “right” is defined by the making of the right choice at the right 
time.161  In this way, the court would not presume there is one single 
“right” choice, no one single “right answer” that just needs to be 
“found.”  Instead, the court would consider the choice the party made 
in light of the available alternatives.  If the open-ended term is, as 
suggested above, a “reasonable delivery date,” the court would 
consider what the options were as to possible delivery dates, 
including—as courts consider now—industry standards and 
customary practices. 
Indeed, Solum’s interpretation of the virtue of justice as 
lawfulness162 (as opposed to fairness163) suggests that this reference 
to—indeed, dependence on—context is actually a strength, not a 
weakness, of virtue theory.  According to Solum’s study of justice as 
“a natural virtue,”164 justice as lawfulness requires that fully virtuous 
citizens in any society (phronimoi) must be able to internalize all 
society’s norms and positive laws.165  Thus, a “fully virtuous agent 
with the virtue of justice as lawfulness will not be disposed to act in 
accord with unjust positive laws or social norms.”166  The converse is 
that a phronimoi in any society will not be able to internalize, and 
thus act in accord with, those social norms and positive laws that are 
not just in any given society.  In other words, aretaic legal theory 
requires contextual judgments, which is a good thing.167 
This should make sense in thinking about contract analysis: 
context-driven inquiries are very familiar in contract.  Karl 
 
161 See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, supra note 1, at 191–92 (describing the virtue of “liberality,” 
which is the virtue of giving, and saying that a person gives virtuously when he gives 
“rightly, for he will give to the right people, and the right amount, and at the right time, 
and fulfil all the other conditions of right giving”). 
162 Lawrence B. Solum, Natural Justice: An Aretaic Account of the Virtue of 
Lawfulness, in VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3, at 167, 167–91 (identifying the 
virtue of justice with the “lawfulness” conception). 
163 See id. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. at 190. 
166 Id. 
167 See, e.g., Solum, supra note 122, at 478 (noting that “[o]ne of the advantages of a 
character-driven approach is the way it responds to a fact that is intractable for many other 
theories: there is no ‘decision procedure for judging’—no rule, complex or simple, that, if 
diligently followed, would magically produce the correct outcome in every case.  Because 
the complexity of the world outruns our ability to make rules, excellence in judging 
requires practical wisdom.”). 
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Llewellyn’s theory of “situation-sense” led to the creation of the 
Uniform Commercial Code (Code), which is full of highly context-
dependent standards (such as what is “reasonable”).  Indeed, the Code 
is celebrated for its pragmatism.  As such, any indeterminacy168 
inherent in practical reasoning could actually be a strength of virtue 
jurisprudence because of the importance of context, especially in 
contract law.169  Courts practice contextual analysis in contract 
already. 
Finally, consider the Aristotelian idea of corrective justice: that the 
transaction should not introduce new inequalities.  This theme is 
consistent with contemporary corrective justice in contract law.  First, 
duty and right in modern contract law are said to be “correlative,” 
which corresponds to the Aristotelian conception of corrective (as 
opposed to distributive) justice.170  Second, and perhaps more 
importantly (as it is more likely to be misunderstood), there is no 
requirement of substantive equivalent in exchange in either ancient 
Greek or contemporary corrective justice.171  In contract, subject to 
the limit of the unconscionability doctrine, modern courts do not set 
aside transactions simply because they seem in some way unequal.172  
 
168 One general objection to virtue theory is that it is indeterminate.  The indeterminacy 
objection has a counterobjection: relativity.  Some contemporary ethicists think the 
contextual nature of Aristotelian reasoning means there can be no “transcultural norms, 
justifiable by reference to reasons of universal human validity.”  Nussbaum, supra note 
114, at 243.  Nussbaum has responded that, by contrast, Aristotle certainly believed in a 
single conception of the human good, based on virtues that “isolate[d] a sphere of human 
experience that figures in more or less any human life, and in which more or less any 
human being will have to make some choices rather than others, and act in some way 
rather than some other.”  Id. at 245.  She notes that contextual reasoning within each 
sphere is a part of every life: “It is right absolutely, objectively, anywhere in the human 
world, to attend to the particular features of one’s context; and the person who so attends 
and who chooses accordingly is making, according to Aristotle, the humanly correct 
decision, period.”  Id. at 257. 
169 See generally Solum, supra note 162. 
170 See WEINRIB, supra note 64, at 136. 
171 The basic premise is stated in The Historical Foundations of Modern Contract Law.  
Horwitz, supra note 113, at 920–23 (asserting that when the common law finally rejected 
the “title theory of contract” at the end of the eighteenth century, courts no longer assessed 
damages by equitable doctrines that required reference to the fairness of the underlying 
exchange). 
172 See WEINRIB, supra note 64, at 138 (noting that courts do not enforce 
unconscionable obligations made unenforceable due to “urgent need or inexperience.”)  
“From the standpoint of corrective justice, the basic idea behind this doctrine is that, 
unless one party intends to bestow an unrequited benefit on the other, the value of what 
they exchange should be approximately equal.”  Id.  By “approximately equal,” Weinrib 
simply seems to mean something less than unconscionable.  Cf. DiMatteo, supra note 93, 
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Instead, courts usually find that the requirements of consideration are 
met unless the inequality of the exchange is so great that it suggests 
the transaction is not a real exchange—that it is instead a fraud, sham, 
or gratuitous.173  Both of these aspects of Aristotelian corrective 
justice are consistent with modern corrective justice in contract.  As 
such, the principle that would guide courts in giving content to an 
open-ended reasonableness term is whether a party’s proffered 
interpretation of that term would introduce new inequalities into the 
relationship.  If so, the interpretation would cast doubt that the parties 
actually intended that side’s interpretation. 
2.  Virtue Theory and the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
A second site where contract interpretation could be enriched by 
virtue theory analysis is the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing.174  Sometimes parties include an express good faith or best 
efforts term; sometimes parties fail to specify such a term but the 
court implies one.  In either situation, the term is litigated when the 
parties disagree as to the content of the duty.  The court’s job is to 
figure out what the parties would have intended, had they considered 
it.  Current literature reflects different approaches,175 but some of the 
Official Comments to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts show 
the standard actually already embodies virtue theory. 
Specifically, the comment to section 205 indicates that the 
covenant requires “faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and 
consistency with the justified expectations of the other party”;176 this 
refers to both the ends of the agreement (the common purpose) and 
the means (faithfulness to the common purpose and consistency with 
 
at 842 (asserting that “fairness of the exchange has progressively become a focus of 
judicial inquiry” (footnote omitted)). 
173 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 (1981) (“If the requirement 
of consideration is met, there is no additional requirement of . . . equivalence in the values 
exchanged . . . .”). 
174 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981) (“Every contract imposes 
upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its 
enforcement.”); U.C.C. § 2-103 (2002) (“‘Good faith’ means honesty in fact and the 
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.”). 
175 Compare Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to 
Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV. 369 (1980), with Robert S. Summers, The 
General Duty of Good Faith—Its Recognition and Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. 
REV. 810 (1982). 
176 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 205 cmt. a (1981). 
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justified expectations of the other side).177  These comments seem to 
suggest that courts should consider both the means and ends of the 
parties’ agreement.  Using the tools of virtue theory analysis could 
help courts give content to these requirements. 
For example, the requirement of “faithfulness to an agreed 
common purpose” could be better defined by applying the 
Aristotelian idea of contractual essence, that the parties to an 
obligation had a particular “end” in mind when they contracted.  What 
did the parties hope to accomplish by this contract?  What were their 
joint goals?  Once known, courts can better ask whether a particular 
action improperly frustrated those goals, in violation of the covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing.  Further, the requirement of 
“consistency with the justifiable expectation of the other side” draws 
on the notion, explained above, that corrective justice requires that the 
parties “not introduce new inequalities” via the transaction.  Finally, 
the comment specifically requires the court to consider what is 
“reasonable” in terms of “community standards of decency, fairness, 
or reasonableness,” so much of the reasonableness analysis above 
would apply here. 
In sum, two doctrinal spaces—reasonableness and the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing—illustrate the mechanics of a 
new idea: applying virtue theory to contemporary contract law.  There 
are certainly other, more intense spaces where this work could go 
next. 
CONCLUSION 
Our discussion will be adequate if its degree of clarity fits the 
subject-matter; for we should not seek the same degree of exactness 
 
177 Id.  (“Good faith is defined in Uniform Commercial Code § 1-201(19) as ‘honesty in 
fact in the conduct or transaction concerned.’  ‘In the case of a merchant’ Uniform 
Commercial Code § 2-103(1)(b) provides that good faith means ‘honesty in fact and the 
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade.’  The phrase 
‘good faith’ is used in a variety of contexts, and its meaning varies somewhat with the 
context.  Good faith performance or enforcement of a contract emphasizes faithfulness to 
an agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of the other 
party; it excludes a variety of types of conduct characterized as involving ‘bad faith’ 
because they violate community standards of decency, fairness or reasonableness.  The 
appropriate remedy for a breach of the duty of good faith also varies with the 
circumstances.”). 
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in all sorts of arguments alike, any more than in the products of 
different crafts.178 
Each of our claims, then, ought to be accepted in the same way, . . . 
since the educated person seeks exactness in each area to the extent 
that the nature of the subject allows; for apparently it is just as 
mistaken to demand demonstrations from a rhetorician as to accept  
. . . persuasive arguments from a mathematician.179 
At the turn of the twenty-first century, normative debates in the 
legal academy have narrowed.  Law and economics viewpoints argue 
that law is about maximizing wealth and welfare.  Deontologists 
argue that law should remain faithful to morality to give credence to 
individual rights.  Nowhere has this dichotomy been as stark as in 
private law—and particularly in contract law.  Yet the world is not so 
simple.  Legal theory should reflect that greater complexity. 
Virtue theory offers one new way to imagine the role of law.  
While lofty, virtue theory is a practical philosophy.  And, contrary to 
most contemporary intuitive notions, virtue was quite important to our 
original conceptions of political and economic liberalism.  It is an 
encouraging sign that scholars across the academy are gradually 
rediscovering virtue—its potential, its pockets of influence, and its 
power to shape theory and answer questions about doctrine. 
In contract, current approaches seem ill-equipped to account for the 
institution’s dualities and complexities.  By contrast, virtue theory fits 
well not only with public law, but also with the social aspects of 
private law.  Moreover, virtue theory can respond to what is, in all 
likelihood, a practical reality—that parties do harbor intent as to both 
how their relationship with their contracting partner should work, and 
what the contract should ultimately produce.  In these ways, virtue 
theory can help courts better account for parties’ intent in such well-
worn doctrinal spaces as reasonableness and good faith and fair 
dealing.  And, because virtue can embrace both utility and individual 
rights, it also may provide a solution to a twenty-first century 
theoretical logjam.  Further work—theoretical, doctrinal, and 
empirical—on virtue in the area of private law may eventually propel 
this quietly elegant theory back to the mainstream. 
 
178 ARISTOTLE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1094b12 to 14, reprinted in READINGS IN 
ANCIENT GREEK PHILOSOPHY: FROM THALES TO ARTISTOTLE 832, 833 (S. Marc Cohen 
et al. eds., 3d ed. 2005). 
179 Id. at 834. 
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